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Pour célébrer le centenaire du zonage dans la ville de New York, je développe une 
vision relative à la revitalisation de l’utilisation des terres et de la réglementation du 
zonage. Le centenaire de la ville n’est pas la seule raison pour laquelle nous avons 
besoin d’une telle vision. Étant donné le grand impact des lois sur l’utilisation des 
terres sur la vie des personnes et sur leur entourage, il est crucial de ré-imaginer le 
système d’utilisation des terres, et notamment le contrôle judiciaire des lois sur 
l’utilisation des terres, et de lui donner un fondement éthique. Le système 
d’utilisation des terres devrait être fondé sur un engagement éthique à promouvoir 
l’équité et la durabilité. Ce système devrait être guidé par des principes de 
démocratie et de transparence, par des normes d’accessibilité, de diversité et de 
densité, et par l’exigence de maintenir un rapport équitable entre la distribution des 
charges et l’allocation des avantages. Cet article explique pourquoi le droit relatif à 
l’utilisation des terres est présentement dépourvu d’engagement éthique. L’article 
offre aussi un aperçu général de la forme que pourrait prendre un tel engagement.  
 
As a way of celebrating its centenary, I sketch out a vision of how to revitalize land use 
and zoning law. Such a vision is called for not merely because of the marking of 100 
years since zoning was first introduced in New York City. Due to the immense impact 
land use laws have on human lives and their surroundings, it is crucial to re-imagine the 
land use law system, and in particular judicial review of land use law, and to ground it 
within an ethical foundation. A land use law system should be based on an ethical 
commitment to fairness and sustainability. It should be guided by principles of 
democracy and transparency; by norms of accessibility, diversity, and density; and by a 
requirement to preserve a fair ratio between the distribution of burdens and the allocation 
of benefits. This article provides an account of why land use law is currently missing an 
ethical commitment and offers a broad outline of the form such an ethical commitment 
could take.  
 
 
THERE IS PROBABLY NO NEED FOR ANOTHER HISTORICAL REVIEW of how it all started for 








 for instance, offer a few 
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1
 The article focuses on the Canadian and American experiences and does not take into account other jurisdictions’ 
historical turn toward extending planning and land use regulation and powers.  
2
 Lewis Mumford, The City in History: Its Origins, Its Transformations, and Its Prospects (New York: Harcourt, 
Brace & World, 1961). 
3
 Peter Hall, Cities of Tomorrow: An Intellectual History of Urban Planning and Design in the Twentieth Century 
(Oxford and New York: Wiley-Blackwell, 2002) [Hall]. 
4
 Michael Allan Wolf, The Zoning of America: Euclid V Ambler (Lawrence, Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 
2008) [Wolf]. See also John F Hart, “Land Use Law in the Early Republic and the Original Meaning of the Taking 
Clause” (2000) 94 Nw UL Rev 1099.  
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such investigations into the past. When marking now the passage of the first 100 years of zoning, 
the reference is to the first comprehensive zoning plan. That plan was implemented in New York 
City in 1916.
5
 The “Zoning Resolution,” as it was officially called, regulated and restricted the 
location of different kinds of uses, such as industries and residential housing, the lot area to be 
built on, and the size and height of buildings.
6
 Its model was soon to be followed by many other 
local communities in the United States and in Canada.
7 
The Zoning Resolution came after some 
thirty years of pioneering building restrictions which were imposed throughout North America, 
including in Canada.
8
 Nonetheless, it was the first attempt to comprehensively regulate land use, 
and for that, it gained its glory. Its lingering influence on other jurisdictions is evident, arguably, 
from the close legal ties that exist between Canadian and American land use jurisprudence, 
despite the many legal and cultural differences between the two countries.
9
 
 But there are at least two other competing milestones to mark the emergence of modern 
land use law. The first is the planning initiatives of late ninetieth century architects, such as 
Ebenezer Howard, with his plans for utopian “Garden Cities,” a detailed model for planned-
from-above towns.
10
 Howardʼs ideas spread to Canada, with the support of the British planner 
Thomas Adams,
11
 and were perceived as “the model for achieving the development of healthy, 
attractive communities in Canada.”
12
 Or Frederick Law Olmsted, with his successful efforts in 
the mid-nineteenth century to convince decision-makers in New York City to fund what would 
later be known as the Central Park.
13
 Olmsted correctly predicted that such an urban park would 
                                                     
5
 Stanislaw J Makeilski, The Politics of Zoning: The New York Experience, Metropolitan Series; No. 4 (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1966); Seymour I Toll, Zoned American (New York: Grossman Publishers, 1969). 
6
 Raphaël Fischler, “The Metropolitan Dimension of Early Zoning: Revisiting the 1916 New York City Ordinance” 
(1998) 64:2 Journal of the American Planning Association 170.  
7
 Elizabeth Bloomfield, “Town Planning Efforts in Kitchener-Waterloo, 1912–1925” (1980) 9 Urban History 
Review / Revue d’histoire urbaine 3 [Bloomfield]; Eran Kaplinsky, “The Zoroastrian Temple in Toronto: A Case 
Study in Land Use Regulation, Canadian-Style” in Eric Tucker, James Muir & Bruce Ziff, eds, Property on Trial: 
Canadian Cases in Context (Toronto: Irwin Law for the Osgoode Society for Canadian Legal History, 2012) 223 
[Kaplinsky]; Marcia Valiante & Anneke Smit, “Introduction” in Marcia Valiante & Anneke Smit, eds, Public 
Interest, Private Property: Land and Planning Policy in Canada (Vancouver and Toronto: UBC Press, 2016) 11 
[Valiante & Smit]. 
8
 E.g. Raphaël Fischler, “Development Controls in Toronto in the Nineteenth Century” (2007) 36 Urban History 
Review / Revue d’histoire urbaine 16. 
9
 See, e.g. Ed Morgan, “The Sword in the Zone: Fantasies of Land-Use Planning Law” (2012) 62:2 UTLJ 163 
[Morgan]; Cherie Metcalf, “The (Ir) Relevance of Constitutional Protection for Property Rights? Compensation for 
Takings in Canada and the United States” (2015) 65:3 UTLJ 143, 173 [Metcalf]: “In both Canada and the United 
States, the reach of takings law is limited by generous deference to land use planning and zoning regulation, 
weakening practical differences in the degree of protection of property across regimes;” Ronit Levine-Schnur & 
Avigail Ferdman, “On the Just Distribution of Land Use Rights” (2015) 28:2 Can JL & Jur 317 [Levine-Schnur & 
Ferdman]. There are however others who stress the differences between the two countries. In this article, I aim not 
to emphasize differences but rather the shared grounds of the two legal systems, although, naturally similarity is a 
matter of scale.  
10
 Sir Ebenezer Howard, Garden Cities of To-Morrow (Cambridge: MIT Press, [1902] 1965). 
11
 Oiva Saarinen, “The Influence of Thomas Adams and the British New Towns Movement in the Planning of 
Canadian Resource Communities” in Alan FJ Artibise & Gilbert A Stelter, eds, The Usable Urban Past: Planning 
Politics in the Modern Canadian City (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s Press-MQUP, 1980) 268. 
12
 “Urban and Regional Planning” in Canadian Encyclopedia, online: <thecanadianencyclopedia.ca/en/article/urban-
and-regional-planning/> [perma.cc/JBN9-5B2W]. 
13
 Frederick Law Olmsted, “Public Parks and the Enlargement of Towns” in American Social Science Association 
1870 (reprinted: Michael Larice & Elizabeth Macdonald, eds, The Urban Design Reader, 2d ed [New York: 
Routledge, 2013] 36). 
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have positive externalities on its surroundings, and that these could be used to secure high 
property taxes.
14
 Indeed, early uses of zoning were designed to preserve the land values of 
properties in existing residential neighbourhoods.
15
 Howard and Olmsted advanced, in different 
ways, the idea that zoning and city planning can produce wealth, health, and prosperity, 
especially when they are binding and centrally directed. Distributional concerns were not their 
central interest, if an interest at all.  
 The second milestone in land use law was achieved in the year 1926, when the United 
States Supreme Court delivered its decision in Village of Euclid v Ambler Realty Co.
16
 In this 
landmark case, the US Supreme Court upheld, for the first time, a comprehensive zoning 
ordinance in the Village of Euclid, a suburb of Cleveland, Ohio. The Supreme Court affirmed the 
constitutionality of zoning ordinances, and ruled that a zoning ordinance must be “clearly 
arbitrary and unreasonable, and without substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals, 
or general welfare,” before it can be declared unconstitutional. The American Federal 
government’s recognition of the zoning practice—with the enactment of the Standard State 
Zoning Enabling Act (SZEA) in 1926, and the Standard City Planning Enabling Act in 1928—
was another important step towards the legal institutionalization of zoning. Thus, by the early 
part of the 20
th
 Century, local governments had guaranteed their power to have full, almost 
unhindered, discretion over zoning and urban planning decisions.
17
 Likewise, in Canada, the 
constitutionality of zoning was never in doubt,
18
 although early judicial attention was given to 
natural justice considerations such as generality and non-retroactive legislation.
19
 
 Planning and zoning laws are usually explained as a modern response to the genesis of 
industrial cities and the resulting social challenges.
20
 In this sense, arguably, government 
officials in Toronto, New York City, and elsewhere were inspired by ideas such as those 
developed by Howard, when they aimed to promote the public’s interest by providing safe, 
healthy, well organized, top-down, controlled spaces.
21 
Alternatively, the development of zoning 
might be explained as reflecting the politics of interest groups.
22
 Property owners and land 
developers realized Olmstead’s predictions in their broader sense and urged city politicians to 
protect and enhance the value of their assets by separating uses, and regulating the density, 
shape, and size of buildings in order to secure higher land values and to preserve the local tax 
                                                     
14
 John L Crompton, “The Impact of Parks on Property Values: A Review of the Empirical Evidence” (2001) 33 
Journal of Leisure Research 1. 
15
 Valiante & Smit, supra note 7 at 12.  
16
 Village of Euclid v Ambler Realty Co., 272 US 365 (1926) [Village of Euclid]. 
17
 William A Fischel, “Zoning and Land Use Regulation” in Boudewijn Bouckaert & Gerrit De Geest, eds, 
Encyclopedia of Law and Economics, Volume II (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2000) 403.  
18
 Leo Longo, “A Brief History of the Initial Zoning Power in Ontario and its Judicial Consideration” (2010) 72:4 
Municipal and Planning Law Reports 62. 
19
 E.g. Cridland v City of Toronto (1920) 48 OLR 266; City of Toronto v Wheeler (1912) 3 OWN 1424; Toronto v 
Williams (1912) 27 OLR 186 (Div Ct).  
20
 E.g. Marcia Valiante, “In Search of the ‘Public Interest’ in Ontario Planning Decisions” in Anneke Smit & Marcia 
Valiante, eds, Public Interest, Private Property: Land and Planning Policy in Canada (Vancouver and Toronto: 
UBC Press, 2016) 104 [Valiante]; Susan S Fainstein & James DeFilippis, “Introduction: The Structure and Debates 
of Planning Theory” in Susan S Fainstein & James DeFlippis, eds, Readings in Planning Theory, 4
th
 ed (Oxford and 
New York: Wiley-Blackwell, 2016) 1; Hall, supra note 3. 
21
 Bloomfield, supra note 7; Kaplinsky, supra note 7 at 229–231. 
22
 Nadav Shoked, “Reinvention of Ownership: The Embrace of Residential Zoning and the Modern Populist 
Reading of Property” (2011) 28 Yale J Reg l91. 
30
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base.
23
 These two background stories may stand in conflict, as they offer different justifications 
and goals for land use law systems. They might, however, be conceived as complementary 
explanations, since either way, whether intentionally or unintentionally, zoning laws are 
correlated with racial and wealth-based segregation.
24
 
 As said, this is not an historical project. The empirical question of how zoning came to be 
in any particular jurisdiction is not the focus of this article. I do wish, however, to point out that 
the existence of two narratives about the purposes of zoning, two different views about the 
driving forces behind its birth—efficiency versus social planning—and the tension between 
them, is in fact ongoing and remains at the core of land use law.
25
 On the one hand, zoning is a 
way to progress towards idealized forms of living. On the other hand, zoning is an externalities-
management mechanism to advance particular interests of the more powerful segments of a 
given society, in particular—a means to influence land prices and subsequent property taxes.
26
 
 I argue that the problem with zoning and land use law and particularly with judicial 
review in this field as set from its genesis by the Euclid Court or the lack of substantial overview 
of planning decisions by Canadian courts, is that zoning and land use law provides a framework 
for decision-making but lacks any substantial ethical commitment. In the larger picture of 
planning, the multiplicity of interests involved in the planning decision-making process has led 
the judiciary, as well as many scholars, to shy away from a focus on the substantive content of 
planning to the mere process of making planning decisions.
27
  
 In this short article I offer an account of how it came to be that such a commitment is 
missing, provide preliminary thoughts as to what such a commitment could look like, and 
suggest what type of questions should be a part of the judicial review of zoning decisions. In 
other words, I argue that there is currently no “narrator” for land use law; it operates under a 
formal setting of “an appeal to reason and logic, through a strong claim to objectivity and certain 
knowledge, through a voice that claims objectivity and authority.”
28
 The omission of an ethical 
commitment in zoning is especially striking given the deeply important distributive justice 
considerations that are determined in the planning process, and that planning has been described 
as having ethical issues at heart.
29
  
                                                     
23
 J Vernon Henderson, “The Impact of Zoning Policies which Regulate Housing Quality” (1985) 18:3 J Urban Econ 
302; William C Wheaton, “Land Capitalization, Tiebout Mobility, and the Role of Zoning Regulations” (1993) 34:2 
J Urban Econ 102. 
24
 Rolf Pendall, “Local Land Use Regulation and the Chain of Exclusion” (2000) 66:2 J Am Inst Plann 125; 
Jonathan Rothwell & Douglas S Massey, “The Effect of Density Zoning on Racial Segregation in US Urban Areas” 
(2009) 44:6 Urban Affairs Review 779; Leah Platt Boustan, Competition in the Promised Land: Black Migrants in 
Northern Cities and Labor Markets (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2016) 105. 
25
 Levine-Schnur & Ferdman, supra note 9. 
26
 Bruce W Hamilton, “Property Taxes and the Tiebout Hypothesis: Some Empirical Evidence” in Edwin S Mills & 
Wallace E Oates, eds, Fiscal Zoning and Land Use Controls: The Economic Issues (Lexington, Mass: Lexington 
Books, 1975) 13; Walter Van Nus, “Towards the City Efficient: The Theory and Practice of Zoning, 1919–1939” in 
Alan FJ Artibise & Gilbert A Stelter, eds, Usable Urban Past Planning and Politics (Montreal and Kingston: 
McGill-Queen’s Press-MQUP, 1980) 237; William A Fischel, The Homevoter Hypothesis: How Home Values 
Influence Local Government Taxation, School Finance, and Land-Use Policies (Boston: Harvard U Press, 2005) 
[Fischel]. 
27
 Valiante, supra note 20 at 108; Adam J MacLeod, “Identifying Values in Land Use Regulation” (2012) 101 Ky LJ 
55 [MacLeod]. 
28
 Gerald B Wetlaufer, “Rhetoric and Its Denial in Legal Discourse” (1990) 76 Va L Rev 1545, 1565. 
29
 Heather Campbell, “‘Planning Ethics’ and Rediscovering the Idea of Planning” (2012) 11:4 Planning Theory 379; 
Mick Lennon & Linda Fox-Rogers, “Morality, Power and the Planning Subject” Planning Theory online 20 May 
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I. WHY IT IS THAT LAND USE LAW LACKS AN ETHICAL 
FOUNDATION? 
 
The Village of Euclid’s zoning ordinance regulated and restricted the location of different 
kinds of uses, including the lot area to be built on, and the size and height of buildings.
30
 As a 
result, it had an adverse effect on the value of the property of Ambler Realty Co.: while the 
property was held vacant waiting to be sold for industrial uses, the ordinance restricted its future 
uses. This limitation meant that its worth would be 25% or less the value of progressive 
industrial development which the owners had been anticipating. The US Supreme Court denied a 
due process and equal protection claim based on the Ordinance’s provisions, and found that the 
Ordinanceand, consequentially, all similar laws and regulationswas justified as an 
application of the police power, asserted for the public welfare.
31
  
The Euclid Court set a very high standard for when judicial interventions in the 
provisions of zoning ordinance will be justifiedonly when such provisions are “clearly 
arbitrary and unreasonable, having no substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals, or 
general welfare.”
32
 Subsequently, in the Nectow case, shortly after Euclid was delivered, the 
Court did leave the door open for concrete overruling of a zoning ordinance application to 
particular conditions if the public goal was not promoted by the zoning classification as 
applied.
33
 But a claim based on this exception has never (or almost never) been accepted, and 
land use law was established as an area of law in which substantive judicial review is beyond 
reach. This is as true in Canada as it is in the US.
34
  
The governing review standard on land use law is therefore that as long as the purposes 
of the land use regulation are “fairly debatable” the court will not substitute its judgment for that 
of the zoning authorities.
35
 This is the predicted result of the judicial reluctance to find de-facto 
expropriations, or “regulatory takings” as they are termed in the US, and as such, leaves judicial 
intervention in land use regulation as only a theoretical option. As Valiante and Smit note, “the 
restrictive test for de facto expropriation in Canada … sends a message about the wide berth for 
                                                                                                                                                                           
2016. For some of the extensive debates in the planning literature over the planner’s profession and the ethical 
values of planning, see, e.g. Susan S Fainstein, The Just City (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2010) 
[Fainstein]; Timothy Beatley, Green Urbanism: Learning from European Cities (Washington, DC: Island Press, 
2012) [Beatley]. My focus is on the legal framework although it draws from these works. 
30
 Wolf, supra note 4 at 36–37. 
31
 Village of Euclid, supra note 16. 
32
 Ibid at para 8. 
33
 Nectow v Cambridge, 277 US 183 (1928) [Nectow]. It should be noted that in this case the Court found a zoning 
ordinance invalid on substantive due process grounds where a master appointed by the lower state court had found 
no justification for the zoning as applied to Nectow’s land. This might explain why in other cases the Court was 
reluctant to intervene in zoning decisions. See Julian Conrad Juergensmeyer & Thomas E Roberts, Land Use 
Planning and Development Regulation Law, 2d ed (St Paul, MN: Thomson/West 2007) 456 [Juergensmeyer & 
Roberts].  
34
 See e.g. The Township of Scarborough v Bondi [1959] SCR 444; Cohen v Calgary (City) (1967), 64 DLR (2d) 
238; Mariner Real Estate Ltd v Nova Scotia (Attorney General) (1998), 65 DLR (4
th
) 727; Canadian Pacific 
Railway v Vancouver (City), 2006 SCC 5. 
35
 Village of Euclid, supra note 16 at 388; Zahn v Board of Public Works, 274 US 325 (1927) 328; Nectow, supra 
note 33 at 188; Robinson v City of Bloomfield Hills, 350 Mich 425 (Supreme Court of Michigan, 1957) at 430.  
32
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planning in Canada.”
36
 Over time, it became clear that the application of a zoning ordinance to a 
particular property would not be upheld by courts, if and only if “the ordinance does not 
substantially advance legitimate state interests or denies an owner economically viable use of his 
land.”
37
 Little, if any, practical limits are actually enforced on the prerogatives of local zoning 
officials,
38
 other than in cases of bad faith, manipulative downzoning (for instance, prior to 
public acquisition by a public body), or extreme discrimination.
39
 
In the American context, the Standard State Zoning Enabling Act of 1926 includes a 
requirement that zoning be done “in accordance with a comprehensive plan.”
40
 Yet, the 
requirement of a master plan has had little practical effect as community-wide zoning ordinances 
were considered sufficient to comply.
41
 The recent influential ruling in Kelo
42
 was considered by 
some as having the potential to induce a shift concerning the necessity to prepare a 
comprehensive plan that contains thoughtful policy goals, at least when the government seeks to 
take private property. In Kelo, the US Supreme Court (Justice Stevens) rested its finding that the 
taking at issue—of Susette Kelo’s private home, for the purpose of imposing an economic 
revitalization development project which would be handed over to private entities after the 
taking—satisfied the constitutional requirement that taking of property be for public use, on the 
existence of a plan of comprehensive character that was adopted following thorough 
deliberation, a plan that “advances some conceivable public purpose.”
43
 Furthermore, in a 
growing number of states, the adoption of zoning ordinances in the absence of a general 
comprehensive plan “may cast doubts upon the validity of the ordinances.”
44
 This current pro-
planning approach is evident in other countries around the globe.
45
 However, there are 
                                                     
36
 Valiante & Smit, supra note 7 at 14. See also Metcalf, supra note 9. In the American context, this is the result 
of Pennsylvania Coal v Mahon, 260 US 393 (1922), and the Penn Central framework for regulatory takings. 
According to the Penn Central test, the courts examine a regulation’s “character” and “economic impact,” asking 
whether the action goes beyond “adjusting the benefits and burdens of economic life to promote the common good” 
and whether it “interfere[s] with distinct investment-backed expectations.” Penn Central Transportation Co. v New 
York City, 438 US 124 (1978); Lingle v Chevron USA Inc., 544 US 528 (2005) at 538; Murr v Wisconsin 582 US 
(2017). 
37
 Agins v City of Tiburon, 447 US 255 (1980) at 260. 
38
 Carol M Rose, “Planning and Dealing: Piecemeal Land Controls as a Problem of Local Legitimacy” (1983) 71:3 
Cal Law Rev 901, 902 (arguing that “local readjustments of land controls may be upheld unless their redistributive 
effects are egregious”); Valiante & Smit, supra note 7 at 13; Mark Fenster, “Failed Exactions” (2011) 36:3 Vt L Rev 
623 at 630.  
39
 See e.g. Re Gibson and Toronto (1913), 28 OR 20 (CA); Hauff v Vancouver (1981), 15 MPLR 8 (BCCA). 
40
 SZEA § 3 (Dep’t of Commerce 1926).  
41
 William A Fischel, The Economics of Zoning Laws: A Property Rights Approach to American Land Use Controls 
(Baltimore, Maryland: John Hopkins University Press, 1985) 33.  
42
 Kelo v City of New London, 545 US 469 (2005) at 484. For the decisionʼs influence on Canadians, see Valiante & 
Smit, supra note 7 at 25. 
43
 Nicole Stelle Garnett, “Planning as Public Use?” (2007) 34:2 Ecology LQ 443, 444 (“Kelo sends a signal to 
Takers that planning is good.”); Wendell E Pritchett, “Beyond Kelo: Rethinking About Urban Development in the 
21
st
 Century” (2006) 22 Ga St U L Rev 895, 915–16; Daniel R Mandelker, “Kelo’s Lessons for Urban 
Redevelopment: History Forgotten” Wash U L Rev Slip Opinions (24 Nov 2008), online 
<http://landuselaw.wustl.edu/Articles/Mandelker%20article%20-%20EIC%20edit%20final%20(clean).pdf> 
[perma.cc/ND6R-SEKM].See Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, “The Uselessness of Public Use” (2006) 106 
Colum L Rev 1412. 
44
 Juergensmeyer & Roberts, supra note 33 at 25 and 27. 
45
 Rachelle Alterman, “Planning Laws, Development Controls, and Social Equity: Lessons for Developing 
Countries” (2014) 5 World Bank Rev 329, 329 (“Implementing or revising planning laws is a booming trend around 
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substantial reasons why Americans are still hesitant to subordinate local land use decision-
making to planning, which include deficiencies in decision-making procedures that guarantee 
existing residents’ control,
46
 insufficient consideration of inter-local and regional impacts,
47
 and 
the effect of the taking jurisprudence.
48
 
In Canada, all provinces have enacted planning legislation. The task of zoning and 
planning is under municipal authority as a result of provincial legislation.
49
 However, there have 
been some changes in recent years, with the imposition of a highly prescriptive policy direction 
by provincial governments, illustrated for example, in Ontario by the Provincial Policy 
Statement (2014) (PPS).
50
 These provincial directives do not generally concern urban 
development and, thus, despite the new guidance, “determining where the public interest lies in 
an individual case remains challenging, and the answer is often unpredictable.”
51
 In addition, 
despite the fact that the Act provides opportunities to allow robust public deliberation, there are 
no guarantees that such deliberation is achieved in practice. As Marcia Valiante summarizes: 
“the Planning Act provides no guidance to municipal councils on how to balance competing 
interests.”
52
 Thus, Canadian municipalities, within their legislative powers, have considerable 
discretion, and judicial review is not regarded as “a vehicle for consideration of the merits of a 
municipality’s decision to pass the bylaw, [but rather of] whether it conforms to proper 
municipal planning principles.”
53
 The power to quash a municipal bylaw is arguably subject to 
prima facie deference,
54
 and practically only a failure to follow a fair process would be a ground 
for quashing a bylaw.
55
 
The provincially-mandated Ontario Municipal Board (OMB), which has oversight over 
local municipalities in regard to land use planning, has often been regarded as casting shadows 
over local level government’s discretion with regards to specific by-laws. The OMB holds and 
applies an unusual degree of regulatory authority over planning matters in comparison to similar 
tribunals in other Canadian provinces.
56
 The board can review all land use planning decisions of 
municipalities or local boards under the Ontario Planning Act,
57
 and it has authority to approve 
or reject those decisions or substitute them with its own decisions. The Board’s pivotal role in 
                                                                                                                                                                           
the globe, especially in developing countries”).  
46
 See e.g. Fischel, supra note 26; David Schleicher, “City Unplanning” (2013) 122 Yale LJ 1670. 
47
 See Richard Briffault, “Our Localism: Part II—Localism and Legal Theory” (1990) 90 Colum L Rev 346, 426–27 
(discussing local externalities); Gerald Frug, City Making: Building Communities without Building Walls (Princeton, 
NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999); David Schleicher, “The City as a Law and Economic Subject” (2010) U Ill L 
Rev 1507, 1516–1528 (pointing to the inefficiency of having many small local governments, a reality which reduces 
agglomerative gains).  
48
 A Dan Tarlock, “Zoned not Planned” (2014) 13:1 Planning Theory 99.  
49
 Jill Grant, “The Nature of Canadian Planning: Planning Canadian Communities” in Jill Grant, ed, A Reader in 
Canadian Planning: Linking Theory and Practice (Toronto: Thomson Nelson, 2008) 3, 18; Sandeep Kumar, 
“Canadian Urban Design Practice: A Review of Urban Design Regulations” (2002) 11 Canadian Journal of Urban 
Research 239. 
50
 Valiante, supra note 20 at 108–113. 
51
 Ibid at 108. 
52
 Ibid at 115. 
53
 Country Park Ltd v Township of Ashfield (2002), 60 OR (3d) 529 at 542 (ONCA). 
54
 Immeubles Port Louis Ltée v Lafontaine (Village), [1991] 1 SCR 326; Morgan, supra note 9 at 169. 
55
 London (City) v RSJ Holdings Inc. [2007] 2 SCR 588. 
56
 Sandeep Kumar, “Urban Design Decision-Making: A Study of Ontario Municipal Board Decisions in Toronto” 
(2005) 14:2 Canadian Journal of Urban Research 209, 213. 
57
 Ontario Planning Act, RSO 1990, c P13. 
34
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planning in Ontario is due to the fact that “it has to a great extent applied its own policy as 
opposed to externally derived public policy.”
58
 Members of the community, including land-
owners and developers, may apply to the OMB concerning local level decisions to implement 
changes to zoning regulations. It is necessary to prove to the OMB that the proposed alteration 
furthers the intent of the comprehensive plan, where zoning changes are often among the most 
contentious land use disputes.
59
  
The OMB’s decisions are final and not subject to judicial review, except on questions of 
jurisdiction or law. In Highbury, the Supreme Court of Canada held that the Board or the 
Minister of Municipal Affairs and Housing (who serves as the head of the Board), in considering 
a subdivision application, was granted wide discretion, but also “that the discretion, wide though 
it is, must be exercised judicially and that it is not a judicial exercise of discretion to impose 
upon the applicant, as a condition of the giving of approval, an obligation the imposition of 
which is not authorized by the [Planning] Act.”
60
 John Chipman notes that neither this decision 
nor Ontario’s Planning Act provide any guidance as to how the Board was to engage in that 
exercise, and it was therefore “left on its own to decide how it should do so, and it has filled this 
legislative and judicial vacuum with its own policies.”
61
 While in a recent case, the OMB listed 
the multiple public interests that it must balance in its decisions,
62
 the Board’s policy is that 
“there is no hierarchy of rights between public and private interests … planning decisions should 
attempt to balance the public good and the private interest.”
63
 The Board’s discretion is, in fact, 
only narrowed by the province’s demand for greater adherence to “provincial interest.” 
The OMB’s practices with regard to agreements under Section 37 of the Planning Act are 
an interesting test case with respect to showing the influence of a quasi-judicial discretionary 
body on municipalities’ behaviour.
64
 Under Section 37, the local government may agree to pass a 
zoning by-law authorizing increases in the height and density of development otherwise 
permitted by the by-law in exchange for the provision of facilities, services or other matters by 
the developer. Aaron Moore has argued that while Section 37 incentivizes municipalities to 
amend their own plans and by-laws as it allows them to wrest concessions and contributions 
from developers, it also subordinates them to do so, because the fact that such an amendment is 
needed for a proposed development project cannot justify the rejection of such an application. 
The result is that local politicians’ functional control over land-use decision-making is 
effectively ceded to the OMB, which can criticize those amendments.
65
 While the OMB has 
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developed its own policies and practices, and may have been able to offer a more coherent 
approach to planning over time, it is still limited on both ends: it does not set the planning 
agenda or the official city’s plan which are still left for the local government to set; and it is not 
subject to substantive judicial review.  
Recent reviews of the Ontario land use system, such as those offered by Stanley Makuch, 
argue that the oversight powers of the OMB, along with politically-driven amendments to the 
practical procedures of land use decisions, bring about lesser degrees of “rule of law” values in 
the Ontario land use system. This is manifested, for example, in the loss of the right of appeal to 
the OMB with respect to many planning decisions (such as under s 34(19) of the Planning Act, 
which limits the right of appeal in respect of the parts of a by-law that give effect to inclusionary 
zoning policies). Those changes contribute to “a growing sense that planning powers are 
arbitrary and virtually limitless.”
66
 
To conclude, the open texture of Euclid and the first Canadian land use court cases, the 
lack of constitutional or clear legislative guidelines, and the complexity of land use law as it has 
developed over the years, have resulted in a nearly unhindered regulatory discretion granted to 
local governments (and, in the Ontario case, the OMB).
67
 Land use limitations are sustained “as 
long as they advance the community’s general welfare,”
68
 and the development potential of 
private land is an allocable community asset.
69
 The construction of the judicial review of zoning 
and land use law in the Euclid case and the first Canadian court cases has been followed since 
thenin the United States, in Canada,
70
 and in other jurisdictionsas if it was an almost 
Euclidean axiom.
71
 What are the acceptable ends that land use laws and zoning ordinances 
should promote? What is the normative basis for governmental intervention in private land 
development? These and related questions were yet to be sufficiently resolved at the doctrinal 
level of US or Canadian constitutional law. At the basis of this normative state of affairs, its 
enabler, is the lack of an ethical foundation for land use law.  
I argue that while full, substantive, judicial review of particular planning decisions should 
not be introduced, we do need to pay sufficient consideration for the normative principles that 
ought to guide the system of land use law. Such basic principles could assist the courts, 
legislators, and the general public in evaluating how the system functions. In other words, I 
contend that courts should not intervene in setting planning or development goals. But the fact 
that this limited mode of intervention in the specific purposes is justified does not mean that no 
normative foundation should exist. Land use law is about the allocation of resources, spaces, 
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burdens, and benefits and as such, it must rest on some guiding norms to make the allocation of 
development rights just and fair. Such an alternative would allow for the basic tension between 
efficiency and social planning to continue, but inject to the land use system a necessary layer of 
ethical commitment to fairness.  
 
II. AN ETHICAL FOUNDATION FOR LAND USE LAW: 
INTRODUCTORY NOTES 
 
In an urban society, land development patterns, particularly urban development, have enormous 
ramifications for human prosperity, freedom, autonomy, and for economic, cultural, and social 
matters.
72
 Conflicting visions and interests are intertwined in almost every land-based decision. It 
is a common wisdom to hold that landowners’ desire is to be the sole and despotic deciders 
regarding their property
73
 or the “agenda-setters” for it.
74
 Viewed from this perspective, legal 
restrictions prescribing what can and cannot be done with private property are considered 
interventions in a property right, which often enjoys a constitutional guarantee.
75
 However, many 
people, owners and non-owners,
76
 have an interest in there being concrete public spheres
77
 in 
which social, political, cultural, and economic interactions can take place.
78
 The fact that the 
world is becoming increasingly digitized does not eliminate (at least for now) the human need 
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for physical—real as opposed to virtual—places for social interactions.
79
  
The riots around the world circa 2011—from Tahrir Square to Wall Street, and to 
Syntagma Square,
80
 to name just a few—exemplified people’s need to occupy public spaces to 
protest and for social interactions.
81
 Moreover, many, even if not all, members of society would 
like urban places to provide all women and men with opportunities for self-fulfillment; and they 
would like the allocation of land development rights to be, at the very least, sensitive to its 
effects on desired social and political policies, such as ensuring equality or protecting the 
environment. Creating and maintaining vibrant public spaces, as well as promoting social goals 
through the allocation of land development rights, come in conflict with property owners’ 
perceptions with respect to their position as such. The conflict between those interests informs 
land use law.  
The basic requirement from any system of land use law should be that it would be 
committed to fairness and sustainability, whereas sustainability stands for fairness between 
present and future, and between mankind and the environment.
82
 In the context of urban 
planning, fairness would be guided by principles of democracy and transparency, by norms of 
accessibility, diversity, and density,
83
 and by a requirement to preserve a fair ratio between the 
distribution of burdens and the allocation of benefits. I will very briefly describe these principles 
below.  
 
A. DEMOCRACY AND TRANSPARENCY  
 
Marking 1916 and the enactment of the first comprehensive zoning plan in New York City as the 
starting point of modern land use law, as many scholars usually do, is a substantive choice. It 
tells us that land use law is not only about the act of land planning per se, even if it is at the basis 
of it; it is also not primarily about the legal-institutional-constitutional aspects of zoning. This 
choice signals the promise which was hidden with the enactment of the first comprehensive plan 
in New York City after a long process of consultation and deliberation: that zoning and city 
planning can be used to secure a joint agreement about the shared expectations for the city’s 
development. Land use law is thus first and foremost about the practice of determining together, 
at the local level, the future of our built environments in a legally binding form.  
Because of the competing goals, the guiding norms for an ethical land use law system 
should touch upon the modes of allocation and the potential goods for allocation. Accordingly, a 
city must conduct an ongoing process of public consultation about the future of its development. 
This process should not be limited to a case-by-case hearing on specific developments.
84
 It 
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should be future-looking. It requires, at the local level, an interdisciplinary think tank, which 
could include urban planners, sociologists, economists, community workers, philosophers, and 
others, as consultants, which would work with local people as representatives of different types 
of groups— residents, developers, young people, families, etc.—who would suggest the local 
policy. Cities are not identical, neither in their current status nor in their visions about the future, 
which may well change over time. A local statement must be prepared, and updated from time to 
time. This statement need describe the current situation—to what extent is it just? How diverse is 
the city? What about density? Are there any specific areas which are denser than others? And 
what about accessibility—is it granted to all? Answering these questions (for example) need rely 
on a report about the city and its users, in a format that includes reference to the economic, 
cultural, and societal viewpoints. On this basis, the statement should address the way it views the 




B. DENSITY  
 
The most important characteristic of urban areas is their density (number of people or dwelling 
units per unit area) and thus their ability to accumulate clusters of activities.
86
 It has been argued 
that the future of the city depends on the demand for density.
87
 This attribute is intimately 
connected to advancing the economic viability, social homogeneity, and cultural development of 
the world as a whole. Economists define cities as the spatial concentration of economic actors.
88
 
Proximity to a concentrated labour market is economically valuable to producers and contributes 
to the value of properties.
89
 The implication of this is that “the demand for cities must come 
ultimately from the desire to reduce transport costs for goods, people and ideas.”
90
 Richard 
Schragger notes that, “clustering of people and firms is the chief characteristic of city space and 
the central economic benefit for which some firms and residents are willing to pay higher 
rents.”
91
 People and firms are more productive in cities because their agglomeration contributes 
to the development of ideas and technology.
92
 The exchange of ideas in the urban environment 
is, as Jane Jacobs maintained, one of the greatest advantages.
93
 With regard to the societal-
psychological aspect, one of the main advantages of dense urban areas is that they facilitate 
social interactions. Density is thus correlated with consumer amenities.
94
 Population density also 
has a strong positive relationship with local innovation. People tend to be more inventive when 
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they are around other inventive people.
95
 Several reasons have been offered for this 
phenomenon: not only economies of scale and the availability of human capital, but also the 





C. DIVERSITY  
 
Population density must be accompanied by diversity. For density to play its part, it requires a 
mixture of people from different backgrounds, who work in different occupations and hold 
different beliefs, as well as a mixture of industries, services, facilities, and the like. Put 
differently, if all people in the city were the same, they could not make a contribution to 
inventiveness or productivity. To produce people who are more tolerant, cities must be 
heterogeneous. Moreover, people are attracted to those cities which feature combinations of 
niche sectors. A study of the occupational structure of fifty large American metropolitan areas 
found that niches in exporting sectors and the related occupational mix were a key to urban 
resurgence.
97
 Cities on the tourism map offer a variety of high-quality activities.
98
 Diversity is 
perceived as an urban amenity, since urban consumers are attracted to ethnic restaurants, 
international cultural offerings, and a lively street scene.
99
  
A few years ago Robert Putnam, in a provocative paper, argued that residential racial 
diversity has a price: it causes a decline in social capital.
100
 The derivative conclusion regarding 
the reduced value of racial diversity was warmly adopted by some, while driving others to re-
examine Putnam’s findings.
101
 Among the latter, Stephanie Stern recently suggested a reverse 
explanation of the relationship between diversity and social capital, according to which it is 
actually the case that where high levels of social capital are found, resistance to diversity will be 
found. Supporting the existence and creation of diverse environments has moral value, with or 
without this explanation. It puts people of heterogeneous backgrounds together, enabling them to 
meet and interact; and it is a practice that facilitates possibilities of demarcating the 
discriminating effects of social, racial, economic, and other natural or adopted categorizations.  
 
D. ACCESSIBILITY  
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Accessibility has two relevant meanings: (1) connectivity, i.e., the ability to physically arrive at a 
place, using a means of transportation which does not cost too much or take too much time; and 
(2) equal, free access to services, places, and opportunities.  
It is commonly argued that accessibility qua connectivity is a fundamental concept in 
theories of metropolitan spatial structure. The standard urban model explains urban structure as a 
function of the trade-offs between access to jobs and housing costs; newer research focuses on 
the trade-offs between access to jobs or other given activity and housing values.
102
 Areas with 
good access to public amenities not only gain better land value,
103
 but also attract a larger portion 
of new development.
104
 Others have established that high environmental standards and good 
access to facilities and services have a direct, positive impact on quality of life.
105
  
Accessibility is also about non-excludability. Urban environments promise the 
accessibility of services and public places and the opportunity to participate in political and 
social life. This concept of accessibility and the importance accessibility should carry was 
influenced heavily by the writings of Henri Lefbvre, though others, such as Iris Marion Young, 




E. BURDEN-BENEFIT RATIO PRINCIPLE107  
 
The most important thing, and the trickiest one, is to identify how to fairly correlate between 
burdens and benefits.
108
 A planning practice may be considered as creating inequality, or unfair 
treatment, if those targeted by harmful regulation, such as eminent domain or the location of 
unattractive uses, “are systematically different from those benefiting from public use projects 
and the benefits of public projects do not sufficiently compensate.”
 109
 The future of land use law 
is in identifying new regulatory models that mitigate these concerns. This should rely on 
empirical, methodological, and theoretical work that would uncover the patterns of inequalities, 
and support innovative ways to overcome them. Recent empirical works on the distribution of 
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At the start of this paper, I promised only preliminary thoughts as to the contents and contours of 
a vision for an ethical commitment in land use planning. I centred this article on the problem 
with zoning and land use law, and particularly with the judicial review in this field, as the lack of 
any substantial ethical commitment in the judicial review of land use decisions. Instead, the 
planning decision-making process has led the judiciary, as well as many scholars, to focus on the 
mere process of making planning decisions, rather than on the substantive content of planning.
111
 
In my response to this theoretical quagmire, I propose that an ethical framework premised on 
fairness and sustainability, wherein sustainability stands for fairness between present and future, 
and between mankind and the environment. In the context of urban planning, fairness would be 
guided by principles of democracy and transparency, by norms of accessibility, diversity, and 
density, and by a requirement to preserve a fair ratio between the distribution of burdens and the 
allocation of benefits. These principles, I argue, articulate an ethical commitment that should 
guide the next 100 years (or so) of North American land use planning. 
While I did not offer here how to advance this ethical commitment in practical or 
empirical terms, nor did I offer how to design a more ethically grounded system, such work is 
desperately needed. Indeed, there is a great room for local, community-based advances to be 
made in this regard. Future work, in academia and in practice, should further think about, and 
experiment with, how to bring together a working framework that is ethically committed and 
could be scrutinized by the courts. So much is at stake here.  
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